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Abstract
The main contribution of this paper is the calculation of the dimension of simple games that are
a composition of unanimity games via individualism. We also provide a constructive procedure
that represent this type of game as an intersection of a number of weighted majority games equal
to its dimension. This provides a better way to achieve exponential dimension (in a monotonic
setting) than that of Taylor and Zwicker (Simple Games, Desirability Relations, Trading and
Pseudoweightings, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999). ? 2001 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Background and summary
It is well known that every simple game can be represented as the intersection of
weighted majority games. It, nevertheless, becomes of interest to ask how e>ciently
this can be done for a given simple game. The question of e>ciency leads to the
de?nition of dimension. A simple game is said to be of dimension k if and only if it
can be represented as the intersection of exactly k-weighted majority games, but not
as the intersection of (k − 1)-weighted majority games. Notice, for example, that a
simple game is of dimension 1 if and only if it is weighted. It is well known that the
dimension of a game is at most the number of maximal losing coalitions, although a
representation of this kind tends to be enormously ine>cient. For example, consider
the United States federal system as a simple game in which there are 537 players. The
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order of magnitude of maximal losing coalitions is 10130 and, consequently, it would
require about 10130 weighted majority games to represent it.
In this paper we will study the dimension of two types of simple games, each of
which is a particular case of the compound simple games introduced by Shapley [4].
For the games that we will consider, each player belongs to one of the m chambers.
The bill is previously accepted or refused in each one of the chambers and ?nally a
rule of global decision (which includes all the possible results for the chambers) is
applied.
Our main focus is in ?nding the dimension of a game that uses unanimity in each
one of the chambers, while the global decision is an individualist game played by all
the chambers. In this case, we will say that the game is a composition of unanimity
games via individualism. This result provides a much better way to achieve exponential
dimension (in a monotonic setting) than Taylor and Zwicker’s use [7] of a particular
dual game for the special case where all chambers have two voters. We also extend
their result by giving a constructive procedure to achieve the dimension.
An interesting interpretation of those two types of simple games is found in the ?elds
of Reliability Systems and Circuits Theory (see, for example, [3]) in which threshold
functions and the additive systems correspond to weighted majority games. To see this,
it is necessary to consider the components of the system as players and the subsets of
components as coalitions of players. From this point of view, the games presented here
correspond, respectively, to parallel–series and series–parallel systems or parallel–series
and series–parallel circuits.
A (monotonic) simple game is a pair (N; v) where N = {1; 2; : : : ; n} is called the
set of players or voters. Every S ⊆N is a coalition, C(N ) is the set of all coalitions,
v : C(N )→ {0; 1}; v(∅)=0 is the characteristic function, which satis?es v(N )=1 and
v(S)6v(T ) if S ⊂T . A coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. The
set of winning coalitions is denoted by W and the set of losing coalitions is denoted
by L.
If each proper subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this winning coalition
is called minimal. It should be noted that a monotonic simple game is completely
determined by its minimal winning coalitions. The set of minimal winning coalitions
is denoted by Wm. If each proper super-coalition of a losing coalition is winning, this
losing coalition is called maximal. The set of maximal losing coalitions is denoted by
LM : A player i ∈ N is winning in (N; v) if v({i}) = 1: If the unique minimal winning
coalition in (N; v) is {i}, then (N; v) is called the individualist game of player i: A
player i has veto in (N; v) if v(S) = 1 implies i ∈ S: If all player in N have veto
in (N; v) then N is the unique winning coalition and the game (N; v) is called the
unanimity game.
A simple game (N; v) is a weighted majority game (WMG) if it admits a represen-
tation by means of the n+ 1 nonnegative real numbers [q;w1; : : : ; wn] such that
v(S) =
{
1 if w(S)¿q;
0 if w(S)¡q;
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where, for each coalition S ⊆N , w(S) =∑i∈S wi. The number q is called the quota
and wi the weight of player i.
The following notion was introduced for graphs in the late 1970s; its extension to
hypergraphs (simple games not necessarily monotonic) is due to Jereslow [2]. Never-
theless, the de?nition of dimension for a simple game is reminiscent of the dimension
[1] of a partially ordered set as the minimum number of linear orders whose intersection
is the given partial ordering.
The dimension of (N;W) is the least k such that there exists weighted majority
games (N;W1); : : : ; (N;Wk) such that
W =W1 ∩ · · · ∩Wk :
In fact, W is the intersection of k nonnegatively WMGs. (since the games considered
here are monotonic), and cannot be written as the intersection of k − 1 WMGs. The
interest in the last de?nition, however, stems from the following (see, for example,
[6]).
Theorem 1.1. Every simple game has a dimension and this is bounded by the number
of maximal losing coalitions.
Most naturally occurring simple games in use are modeled by simple games of
dimension 1 or 2. Interesting examples of dimension 2 are the United States federal
system and the procedure to amend the Canadian Constitution, see [6]. In the books
of Taylor [5] and Taylor and Zwicker [7], the authors deal with dimension theory for
simple games.
2. Dimension of composition of unanimity games via individualism
In this section, we will determine the dimension of games whose set of players
N = {1; : : : ; n} admits a partition N1; : : : ; Nm in such a way that
W = {S ⊆N : ∃ Ni with Ni⊆ S}: (1)
In this kind of game, passage requires at least all of the votes in one of the chambers
Ni (i = 1; : : : ; m).
From now on, the games de?ned in (1) will be called the composition of m una-
nimity games (N; ui) via individualism. Notice that for this type of game, Wm =
{N1; : : : ; Nm}:
Let ni=|Ni|; for i=1; : : : ; m, and suppose throughout this section that 16n16 · · ·6nm.
If m=1 then N =N1 and Wm = {N} which is a WMG and admits the representation
[n; 1; : : : ; 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
]:
If m¿2 and nm−1 = 1 the game is
Wm = {{1}; : : : ; {m− 1}; {m; : : : ; n}}; (2)
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which is a weighted majority game (and, therefore, has dimension 1) and admits the
representation
[n− m+ 1; n− m+ 1; : : : ; n− m+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
; 1; : : : ; 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−m+1
]:
From now on, we will exclude both cases. The set of maximal losing coalitions is
LM = {S ⊆N : |S ∩Ni|= ni − 1, for all i=1; : : : ; m}. Using Theorem 2.1 and the fact
that |LM | = n1 · : : : · nm; we get that the dimension of (N;W) is at most n1 · : : : · nm:
We will now see that if at least one of the chambers has more than one player, this
result can be improved.
Theorem 2.1. Let (N;W) be a composition of m unanimity games (Ni; ui) for i =
1; : : : ; m with 16n16 · · ·6nm via individualism. Then the dimension of (N;W) is
n1 · : : : · nm−1:
Proof. If m = 1 or nm−1 = 1 the game has dimension 1 as seen above. If nm−1¿ 1;
Claims 1 and 3 below will show that (N;W) has the desired properties. Claim 2 is a
combinatorial lemma required in the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 1. (N;W) is the intersection of n1 · : : : · nm−1 WMGs.
Proof. For j = 1; : : : ; n1 · : : : · nm−1; let (N;Wj) be the WMGs whose quota is q =
nm and in each one of these distinct games there is a unique player in every class
Ni (i = 1; : : : ; m− 1); whose weight coincides with the quota q; the remaining players
belonging to these classes have weight 0. Let all the players that belong to Nm have
weight 1. Now we must show that
W =
n1·:::·nm−1⋂
j=1
Wj:
(⊆) It will be enough to prove this inclusion for minimal winning coalitions. Assume
?rst that S=Ni (i=1; : : : ; m−1). Then Ni ∈Wj for all j=1; : : : ; n1 · : : : ·nm−1 because
in each one of the games (N;Wj) there is a unique winning player in Ni. Second, as
every player in Nm has weight 1 in each game (N;Wj); the total weight of Nm equals
with the quota in every game (N;Wj).
(⊇) Suppose that S ∈W: It will su>ce to show that if S ∈LM ; then |S∩Ni|=ni−1
for every i = 1; : : : ; m: Let ki be the unique element in Ni − S for every i = 1; : : : ; m.
Then S is a losing coalition in the WMG de?ned as follows: q = nm for every ki ∈
Ni − S; i = 1; : : : ; m− 1; weight 1 for players in Nm and weight 0 otherwise.
Claim 2. Among 1 + nm maximal losing coalitions of (N;W) there exist two of
them; R and T; such that
∃ i ∈ R− T; i ∈ Np;
∃ j ∈ T − R; j ∈ Nq; q = p:
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Proof. Let R1; : : : ; R1+nm be distinct maximal losing coalitions of (N;W). Consider R1
and R2. If these coalitions do not accomplish the enunciated property, then there exists
16p6m such that
R1 ∩ Np = R2 ∩ Np;
R1 ∩ Nq = R2 ∩ Nq if q = p:
Now, the set
A
p
R1 ={S ∈LM : S ∩ Np = Np−{k} for all k ∈ Np; S ∩ Nq = R1 ∩ Nq if q = p};
satis?es R1; R2 ∈ ApR1 and |A
p
R1 | = np. Since 1 + nm¿np there exists at least one
coalition Rl; l= 3; : : : ; 1 + nm such that Rl ∈ApR1 and, either
Rl ∩ Np = R1 ∩ Np or Rl ∩ Np = R2 ∩ Np:
Now, de?ning
R=
{
R2 if Rl ∩ Np = R1 ∩ Np;
R1 otherwise;
and
T = Rl;
the enunciated property follows, i.e.,
∃ i ∈ R− T; i ∈ Np;
∃ j ∈ T − R; j ∈ Nq; p = q:
Claim 3. (N;W) is not the intersection of n1 · : : : · nm−1 − 1 WMGs.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, thatW is the intersection of n1 · : : :·nm−1−1; WMGs
(N;Wj). Since |LM |= n1 · : : : · nm and
n1 · : : : · nm
n1 · : : : · nm−1 − 1 ¿nm
by a generalization of the pigeon-hole principle, there would be at least 1+nm maximal
losing coalitions in the same WMG (N;Wk). Consider these 1 + nm maximal losing
coalitions. By Claim 2, it is always possible to ?nd coalitions R; T such that
∃ i ∈ R− T; i ∈ Np;
∃ j ∈ T − R; j ∈ Nq (q = p):
From here, we observe that
R ∈Wk ;
R− {i} ∪ {j} ∈Wk ;
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Table 1
Upper bounds for the minimum number n of players required to get dimension p
p n p n
2 4 656p681 15
36p64 6 826p6128 16
56p68 8 1296p6162 17
9 9 1636p6256 18
106p616 10 2576p6324 19
176p618 11 3256p6512 20
196p632 12 5136p6729 21
336p636 13 7306p61024 22
376p664 14 10256p61458 23
since Nq⊆R − {i} ∪ {j}. Comparing the weights from both coalitions in the game
(N;Wk) it follows that wki ¡w
k
j . On the other hand,
T ∈Wk ;
T − {j} ∪ {i} ∈Wk ;
since Np⊆T −{j} ∪ {i}. If we compare the weights from both coalitions in the same
game (N;Wk) we have wkj ¡w
k
i . Both inequalities contradict the fact that (N;Wk) is
a WMG
Theorem 2.1 provides a better way to achieve exponential dimension (in a monotonic
setting) than that of Taylor and Zwicker [7]. In particular, let (N;W) be a composition
of m unanimity games with k = n1 = · · · = nm via individualism. Then the dimension
of (N;W) is km−1.
If one has a game of dimension q and realizes it as intersection of q WMGs, then
intersecting any p6q of these yields a game of exact dimension p. Using this fact
and Theorem 2.1, one can obtain games of every dimension with a reduced number of
players. Table 1, based on Theorem 2.1, shows for small dimension p upper bounds
for the minimum number n of players required to get a game of dimension p.
Example 2.2. To illustrate the calculation of the dimension of a game that is a com-
position of unanimity games via individualism, by means of an example, we consider
the 7-person game (N;W) de?ned as
Wm = {{1; 2}; {3; 4}; {5; 6; 7}}:
As a parallel–series system (in terms of Reliability theory) its schematic diagram is
given in Fig. 1.
Applying the result obtained in Theorem 2.1, the dimension of this game is 4 and
a representation of the game as the intersection of 4 WMGs is
W= [3; 3; 0; 3; 0; 1; 1; 1] ∩ [3; 3; 0; 0; 3; 1; 1; 1]
∩ [3; 0; 3; 3; 0; 1; 1; 1] ∩ [3; 0; 3; 0; 3; 1; 1; 1]:
J. Freixas, M.A. Puente /Discrete Applied Mathematics 113 (2001) 265–273 271
Fig. 1. Parallel–series structure of Example 2.2.
3. A concluding remark: the dual case
If a game with player set N = {1; : : : ; n} admits a partition N1; : : : ; Nm in such a way
that
W = {S ⊆N : |S ∩ Ni|¿1; for all i = 1; : : : ; m}; (3)
we shall say that this game is a composition of m individualist games via unanimity.
Let ni = |Ni| (i = 1; : : : ; m); and suppose throughout this section that 16n16 · · ·6nm.
We notice that if nm = 1; then m = n so we obtain the unanimity game, in which
case the unique winning coalition is the grand coalition N . This game is a weighted
majority game, and therefore its dimension is 1. In the following, we will exclude this
case.
In this kind of game passage requires a total of at least m of the n possible votes,
subject to the proviso that at least one vote is obtained from each chamber Ni (i =
1; : : : ; m). It can also be interpreted as a particular case of compound games, introduced
by Shapley [4], v[u1; : : : ; um]; where v : {1; : : : ; m} → {0; 1} denotes the unanimity
game played in the m chambers and each one of ui : Ni → {0; 1} (i = 1; : : : ; m) is an
individualist’s game. Taylor and Zwicker [7] did the calculation of the dimension for
the special case where all the chambers have two voters and we point out:
(a) the calculation done by them trivially generalizes if all the chambers have at least
two voters, and
(b) adding a veto player does not change dimension. This is known for dimension 1,
and the point is that chambers of size 1 can be realized by adding dummy players
and then giving them veto power.
Speci?cally, the generalization of their result is:
Theorem 3.1. Let (N;W) be a composition of m individualist games (Ni; ui) (i =
1; : : : ; m) with 16n16 · · ·6nm via unanimity and let p¡m such that either np = 1;
np+1¿ 1 or p= 0 if n1¿ 1. Then the dimension of (N;W) is m− p.
272 J. Freixas, M.A. Puente /Discrete Applied Mathematics 113 (2001) 265–273
Fig. 2. Series–parallel structure of Example 3.2.
It is straightforward to check that one way to express (N;W) as the intersection of
m− p WMGs, Wj; is (N;W1) ≡ [q1;w11 ; : : : ; w1n] where
w1i =


0 if i ∈ Nk; k¿p+ 2;
1 if i ∈ Np+1;
np+1 otherwise;
q1 = p · w11 + 1:
The remaining WMGs (N;Wj) ≡ [qj;wj1; : : : ; wjn]; for every j=2; : : : ; m−p, are de?ned
as follows
wji =
{
0 if i ∈ Nk; k = p+ j;
1 otherwise;
qj = 1:
Example 3.2. Consider the 9-person simple game (N;W) whose minimal winning
coalitions are
Wm = { {1; 2; 3; 5; 7}; {1; 2; 3; 5; 8}; {1; 2; 3; 5; 9};
{1; 2; 3; 6; 7}; {1; 2; 3; 6; 8}; {1; 2; 3; 6; 9};
{1; 2; 4; 5; 7}; {1; 2; 4; 5; 8}; {1; 2; 4; 5; 9};
{1; 2; 4; 6; 7}; {1; 2; 4; 6; 8}; {1; 2; 4; 6; 9}}:
This is a compound game v[u1; : : : ; u5]→ {0; 1} in which v : {1; : : : ; 5} → {0; 1} denotes
the unanimity game played in the ?ve chambers, and each one of the games ui :Ni →
{0; 1} is an individualist one, being N1 ={1}; N2 ={2}; N3 ={3; 4}; N4 ={5; 6}; N5 =
{7; 8; 9}; then, n1 = n2 = 1; n3 = n4 = 2; n5 = 3: As a series–parallel system (in terms
of Reliability theory) its schematic diagram is given in Fig. 2.
Using the extended results of Taylor and Zwicker we have that the dimension of
(N;W) is m − p = 5 − 2 = 3; and one of the representations for the game as the
intersection of WMGs is
W = [5; 2; 2; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0] ∩ [1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0] ∩ [1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1]:
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It is interesting to note that in the games that are compositions of m individualist
games (N; ui) (i=1; : : : ; m) via unanimity, the usual description of the game, by means
of minimal winning coalitions, requires n1 · : : : · nm coalitions (with ni = |Ni|) and each
one of them has m players, i.e., m · n1 · : : : · nm digits are needed to describe the game.
Using intersections of WMGs, (n+1) ·(m−p) digits are required to describe the game.
This latter number is generally much smaller than the former, and so, the description
of the game is much shorter.
As an example, consider a 30-person game of the type described with n1=n2=n3=10.
In this case, the game has 1000 minimal winning coalitions each of which has 3 players.
Using minimal winning coalitions, 3000 digits would be required to de?ne the game.
On the other hand, as the dimension of the game is 3, we would then require only 93
digits to describe the game as an intersection of 3 WMGs.
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